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This article deals with an aspect of the contemporary political crisis 
in Western countries, namely, the sharpening conflict between poli-
tics and truth, a problem interwoven with the progressive loss of au-
thoritativeness in contemporary politics. The risk of reducing truth to 
opinion is to be expected in a merely procedural interpretation of de-
mocracy, obscuring the element of shared truth that lies at the origin of 
every political community. The expansion of power to the detriment of 
authority contributes ultimately to forgetting the original truth, that 
should instead be refocused and brought up-to-date in order to give a 
sense of direction once again to communal life. A notable aid for pro-
ceeding in that direction is the dialectic method, with which the search 
for truth in Western civilization began, on the basis of which the truth 
is always a communitarian quest. Such a communitarian vision as-
sumes particular importance in light of the renewed insights brought 
by Christian revelation to the categories used for analyzing human 
and political relationships. 
You have touched a tender nerve in many people, punctur-ing their existential lie, and they hate you for it. . . . Truth gets beaten to death, as Kierkegaard said of Socrates and 
of Jesus.”1 This passage from a famous letter of Karl Jaspers writ-
ten to Hannah Arendt in the middle of the twentieth century ad-
dresses the difficult relationship between truth and politics once 
again in connection with the Holocaust. It is always a tormented 
relationship. The issue of truth, indeed, is not restricted to the in-
dividual conscience, but by its very nature tends to become a mat-
ter of public relevance, posing the question not only of what in a 
determined situation or historical period is the truth for an indi-
vidual, but also what truth is for the community.
Traditionally, truth was always the professional object of phi-
losophers in the profound sense of a profession of faith or a life 
choice. Indeed, Socrates lived out the conflict between truth and 
politics to its ultimate outcome. He was condemned by the state, 
which did offer him the possibility of avoiding death by accept-
ing exile. That was an exquisitely political solution, a compromise 
by the majority who affirmed his guilt that provided a way out to 
avoid the accusation of cruelty. Either way, they would be free of 
Socrates. But this was a solution Socrates could not accept since 
where the choice is between truth and falsehood, compromise is 
not possible because the truth does not allow for bargaining.2 By 
accepting death, Socrates exposed the false judgment entailed in 
1. Karl Jaspers, “Letter of July 25, 1963,” in E. Young-Bruehl, Hanna Arendt: For Love 
of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 402.
2. This is a principal message in The Apology of Socrates. 
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the offer for what it was, and let everyone see how real the lie was 
that condemned him.
Socrates represents the conflict between truth and politics in 
which opinion plays the lead role. Whether opinion is true or false, 
it belongs to a different order from truth because it is not a certain 
knowledge. Many people professed opinions over Socrates’ trial, 
which was effectively conducted by the civil authority in order to 
channel the proceedings in the desired direction and to determine 
the sentence. From a philosophical standpoint, sycophants and 
sophists brought into the trial elements foreign to the truth but 
useful as instruments of the political power. Their artistry, while 
similar to the dialectic used by philosophers following Socrates in 
seeking the truth, is distinguished from the latter precisely because 
it does not have the truth as its goal and orientation. The sophists, 
Plato observed, do not use dialectic, but eristike,3 a form of struggle 
in which adversaries brandish opinions that are often only a cam-
ouflage for their real interests. Dialectic as the art of searching for 
truth is replaced by rhetoric, the art of persuasion.4 The critique of 
ideology, as we see here, originated well before Karl Marx. 
Socrates’ case is not an isolated one. His successor, Plato, already 
recognized the danger of espousing the truth before those who are 
accustomed to opinion. Now that he had freed himself from im-
prisonment at the back of the cave, would he dare explain to the 
other prisoners that there was another world, a real one of which 
most people were unaware?5 Yet Plato accepted the risk and cre-
ated the most famous school of all time, the Academy, a true and 
open forum within, and often contrary to, the city administration. 
3. Plato, Sophist, 226a. 
4. Plato, Gorgias, VII, 451d–452e.
5. Plato, The Republic, VII, 514a–517a.
The conflict between truth and politics has remained alive 
throughout history. Even when the philosopher sided with the state 
and against the truth, he or she remained aware of how distinct the 
two were: “Disobedience,” writes Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, 
“can legitimately be punished in those who teach a philosophy 
contrary to the law, even if it is true.”6 The state would be able then 
to embrace a lie officially if it is useful for achieving its ends. Even 
Plato agreed that officials could lie for the good of their subjects, 
emphasizing that what is inadmissable in philosophy can be ef-
fective in politics. Hobbes’s point is that the state is the one thing 
truly necessary for maintaining order and guaranteeing security 
in the life of its citizens. For Hobbes, politics is a function of life 
regardless of how it may be conducted, whereas for Socrates, a life 
deprived of truth is not worth living. From Hobbes’s point of view, 
truth and politics are clearly separate, and politics is interested in 
truth only when it becomes a problem of public order. Therefore, 
the lie in politics is often justified as the lesser evil. People are 
lied to “for their own good,” and to avoid recourse to more violent 
means of persuasion. On that basis, truth and politics belong to 
two different orders that never communicate. This raises the ques-
tion: Is there any point where truth and politics can meet? If so, 
what might it be?
Authority and the Separation of Truth from Politics
The separation of truth from politics is common currency today. 
It has become a key issue in a skewed vision of democracy that 
knowingly renounces the truth in favor of opinion. Procedur-
ally, the exercise of polical power is not based on truth but on 
6. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, XLVI. 
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the opinion of the citizens. In reaching decisions at the national, 
regional, and local levels, the question is not whether the opinions 
of the citizens are true; just tally them. From this perspective, the 
logic of political decision making excludes concern for the truth so 
that conflicts can be resolved in a nonviolent fashion. If the various 
parties came to blows, each in the name of the truth that allows 
no compromise, there would be total deadlock and no possibility 
of resolution. This is the justification for making decisions on the 
basis of majority rule. That being the case, there is no guarantee 
that the resulting decisions will be true, only that they were made 
without recourse to violence or war. 
There is some element of wisdom in this position: it does not 
wish to claim as true that which was decided by a short-term ma-
jority. This avoids admitting the existence of a unique truth that 
tends to impose itself and that would rule out the freedom of each 
individual to adhere personally to a freely sought and chosen truth. 
These are issues of prudence that contemporary democracies have 
verified in the struggle against totalitarianism that did not take 
account of those principles in the twentieth century. But there is 
a weakness to this approach: accepting such limitations to human 
reason leads to a distrust of its ability to reach certainty. This dis-
trust of reason proclaims a distrust of human nature, a distrust of 
its relational dimension because it makes truth a matter of only 
personal choice, thus limiting it to that which is true for the indi-
vidual in a private domain where truth is “relative” and has no value 
on a universal level. In this way, it induces a subtle mystification: 
this weakness of reason is presented as something positive because 
it would allow free debate for individuals to determine communal 
certainties that would not have to be acknowledged as objective 
truths. Truth is now the fruit of agreement; it is a conjectural truth 
established by convention. 
This is very different from the truth Plato is speaking about, 
namely, a dialectic search that philosophers carried out together 
leading to a recognition of the truth that was not considered as 
hypothetical. Searching together did not express the need for the 
potential antagonists to agree, but was seen simply as the only way 
to find the truth. They could point out one another’s errors and so 
make progress because the very nature of truth is manifested in a 
community, and only then to the individual after the community 
has made her or him capable of receiving it.7 Perhaps we can learn 
today from this philosophical attitude of Plato, which holds both 
to the existence of objective truth and to the free personal and 
communal search for it. Today, these two things are considered 
contradictory, with the result that various political theories opt for 
one or the other. But it is only by holding on to both of them to-
gether that an adequate foundation for the democratic ideal can be 
established. This is the core of the problem.
A correct understanding of democracy recognizes not only the 
power of the majority of the moment, but also an authority that 
we could call “foundational authority.” This is the totality of the 
universally accepted principles on which the political society is 
based and which are generally expressed in the state Constitution 
or other documents of similar importance. A state takes shape in 
extraordinary moments through very real historical trials for that 
population: an ethnic migration, a war of liberation or a civil war, 
citizens seeking refuge from oppressive regimes, the conquest of 
7. Plato, Seventh Letter, 341c–d. 
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new territories, the breakup of an empire, or the establishment of 
a federation, etc. These are opportunities when the people, forged 
by some historic testing, draw out of culture, religion, tradition, 
and life experiences the guidelines for the establishment of a new 
state. These opportunities provide illumination and intuition in 
which events, debates and ideas erect the supporting pillars for the 
constitution that will continue for years to come. Its principles are 
kept alive by the many cultural traditions that contribute to the 
foundation of the political society. In this process, all the subse-
quent laws voted on by a particular majority should be confronted 
with the founding values, and, if there is conflict, they should be 
modified. The values of the foundational authority were, in fact, ac-
knowledged as true. They can be reread, reinterpreted, and brought 
up-to-date, but not suppressed unless there is a conscious desire to 
change the nature of that society itself. 
This foundational authority, distinct from the power of the 
majority—or the monarch or government—was often recognized 
and accepted for millennia. In the distant past, it was said to be 
the “will of the gods” to which the ruler himself had to submit. 
More recently in the West, through the influence of Christianity, 
there was recognition of an antecedent “natural law” that could 
not be contravened by the laws of the state.8 With the arrival of 
democratic states, constitutions often blended together religious 
inspiration, recognition of natural law, and the principles and ex-
periences that led to the foundation of the state. In these cases, 
politics is not contrasted to the truth. Rather, in the course of his-
tory, especially during the decisive moments when a new political 
body is born, politics recognizes its own need for the truth as well 
8. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, q.91, a.3. 
as the fact that it cannot decide the truth itself. It can only adapt to 
it because truth belongs to an authority prior to and greater than 
politics itself.
The concern today is the increasing tendency—both in theory 
and in daily political practice—to deny this type of authority and 
leave everything up to the will of the majority, even if it means 
bypassing or impudently modifying the constitutional principles. 
In that way, it seems that politics leaves it to individual citizens to 
decide for themselves their “own” truth. In many democratic coun-
tries, laws are made that leave—apparently—the important deci-
sions to the individual (for instance, abortion, euthanasia, wages 
insufficent to secure the minimum to live), forgetting that in many 
cases an indispensable value is at stake. In doing this, the politi-
cal power takes a step ahead toward privatizing and relativizing 
the truth. Truth is no longer seen as a common patrimony, but 
it is equated with private opinion and then established by ma-
jority rule. We are no longer at the mere procedural exclusion of 
the truth in favor of opinion, an exclusion that, as we have seen, 
contains some elements of wisdom. We are now actually giving 
opinions the value of truth. This is how political power cancels all 
limitations to its own exercise and “takes possession” of the truth. 
But a truth that is owned by someone is meaningless and can be 
brandished about like a club, modified, adapted, and twisted at 
pleasure. This explains much of the so-called normal behavior of 
the political class today. With the swirl of declarations, denials, 
change of positions, and the forming and then the dissolving of 
alliances, and given the indifference of too many citizens, many 
politicians seem to have lost all sense of their calling. They are 
continually changing their “plan of action,” giving the impression 
that they have lost their way. When parties have lost their way, the 
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community at large loses its way. With the abandonment of truth 
in politics goes also the loss of real authoritativeness. 
Real authority is, in fact, quite different. It means preserving a 
plan, conserving the principles and values that established the life 
of the community or group, and hence maintaining a clear aim 
and direction. Authority calls forth the original basis and source 
of community life. As a parent retains authority even when he or 
she no longer has power over the children, the founders of a state 
retain authority even when they no longer govern. Parents are not 
simply loved, but are honored, and rendering honor is expressed 
through fidelity, which is a steadfast attitude that does not expire 
and require renewal. This is also the case with the real authority 
of the state. The state’s power is only an instrument for bringing 
about and making explicit in the daily life of the citizens those 
principles that the authority is charged always to preserve. Power 
must be “authoritative,” that is, it must always act in accord with 
the overall design that the authority preserves. If this should be 
disregarded, then power is left with mere empty procedures and 
becomes irrelevant or introduces—out of either triviality or the 
triumph of one particular ideology or the pressure of private inter-
ests—measures that contradict its foundational values. Then, for 
example, in a political community that was instituted to affirm 
equality and freedom and to defend life, daily decisions can be 
made that are actually inimical to equality, freedom, and life. In the 
worst case scenario, power without boundaries and without the 
direction established by foundational authority becomes an op-
pressive power, a real terror. In any case, what characterizes power 
detached from authority is infidelity. This explains one aspect of 
today’s crisis of political authority: the difficulty of believing in 
someone who is not faithful. 
Authority and the Limitations of Power:  
From the Tree to the Cross
The distinction between authority and power is not just an issue 
for us today. On the contrary, it has been a starting point for civili-
zation right from the beginning of history. The book of Genesis is 
not just a holy text, but also a document bearing on of the begin-
nings of civilization. Indeed, it gives us early categories for inter-
preting communal life. It is an original reflection on the human 
condition which—along with other converging currents—influ-
enced the development of Western history and remains operative 
even today.
The distinction between authority and power is a central issue 
from the very outset of Genesis, especially as regards the divine 
origin of authority and the limits of human power. The human 
person is created by God and receives from God a “mandate of 
dominion” that qualifies human nature.9 Romano Guardini writes: 
“The human being’s natural likeness to God consists in this gift of 
power, in the capacity to make use of it and in the governance that 
flows from it.”10 Guardini is speaking of the “ontological” char-
acter of power: “One cannot be human and then over and above 
that exercise some power; rather, exercising that power is part of 
what one is.”11 In symbolic language, the first chapters of Genesis 
present a picture containing, at least in germinal form, a number 
of important elements from which a doctrine of the limitation of 
power can be developed.
9. Genesis 1:28. 
10. Romano Guardini, Die Macht: Versuch einer wegweisung (Würzburg: Werkbund-
Verlag, 1957), p. 31. 
11. Ibid. 
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Power is limited first of all because of its origin. The mandate 
to dominion is in fact received from God; therefore, it is a power 
that must conform to the authority of the Creator and always be 
answerable to the Creator. This is the essence of the limitation of 
power. It lies in the fact that it is not self-creating, but receives its 
being given its origin outside those who exercise it. This limita-
tion is represented by the prohibition against eating the fruit of 
the tree in the middle of the garden. The tree marks a boundary, 
but also constitutes the axis of the human world in establishing a 
center around which human power is exercised and given direc-
tion. Therefore in this sense, the limitation is not seen as a denigra-
tion of those people on whom it is imposed, but, like a definition, 
it confers an identity, it brings a fulfillment. The error of Adam 
and Eve consists precisely, according to the ancient story, in violat-
ing the prohibition. That is, they denied any boundary that might 
mark a distinction between divine authority, which has a creative 
and absolute power, and human power, which cannot create but 
only can bring creation to further perfection. Adam and Eve want 
to be gods who are self-sufficient and can shape the plan of God to 
their own ends. But this would obscure its very design and weaken 
their ability to fulfill the mandate of dominion.
Second, besides being limited by the existence of the authority 
that establishes it, human power is limited because it presupposes 
the object on which it is exercised, that is, on humankind and creation. 
Power is limited because humankind is not the creator; persons 
can only co-create, carry to fulfillment, and make perfect, but they 
cannot remake. The highly symbolic episode in which Adam con-
fers a name on the animals explains the nature of human power: 
the human being only acknowledges the animals’ nature.12 Their 
12. Genesis 2:19–20. 
nature is revealed by Adam; he does not invent it. On the contrary, 
in eating the forbidden fruit Adam and Eve want to be their own 
masters as absolute masters of everything. Their action will pro-
voke nature to rebellion, and it will refuse complete submission. 
The earth will not be totally humanized; rather, human beings will 
die and become earth.13 Positively speaking, this awareness that 
power is exercised on an already given is present also in some of 
the most significant modern concepts of the origin of the state. 
Both John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with their different 
perspectives, presuppose the existence of a natural law antecedent 
to the contract that generates the political society, which has the 
task of safeguarding and expressing that law. 
Third, power is limited in its mode of exercise. Indeed, our being 
in the “image and likeness” of God—which is manifested first of 
all, as Guardini emphasized, in the bestowal of the mandate—
finds its full expression, as the creation story of the priestly tra-
dition emphasizes, in the unity and distinction that constitute 
human beings: “God created man in his image; in the divine 
image he created him, male and female he created them.”14 The 
relationship between male and female, as Genesis describes it, reflects 
human reality as “image” of God. This says something to us about 
God because God is not described directly but through the re-
lationship between male and female. This relationship expresses 
the logic of the relationships in the Garden of Eden, and explains 
also the way in which the two enter into relationship with cre-
ation. That is, it defines how their dominion will be exercised. This 
relationship received from God is a harmonious relationship of 
full transparency and mutual giving. The ordering that will come 
13. Genesis 3:19. 
14. Genesis 1:27. 
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about through dominion will have to reflect the existing order be-
tween male and female, and between them and God. It is an ethic 
of love that applies to dominion in general, to every exercise of 
power, and therefore also to political power. Such an ethic—in the 
biblical perspective—is the essential norm for exercising power 
from which all other norms rise. Also, power is not absolute in 
that it is regulated. The fundamental rule, the rule of rules, is love. 
Disobedience of the divine authority entails the loss of loving re-
lationships. Man and woman, from a condition of harmony and 
equality, fall into one of conflict and subordination, represented by 
the submission of the woman to the man. This explains symboli-
cally, and at the same time ontologically, the perennial possibility 
that the use of power will become domination of persons over 
persons. 
In short, according to this interpretation of Genesis, power must 
show a threefold fidelity: to the authority that grants it, to the na-
ture of the object on which it is exercised, and to the love ethic that 
regulates relationships between creatures. And right at  this key 
point we come upon the other great foundational event of West-
ern civilization: the opening up to Christianity. From a Christian 
point of view, the forbidden tree extends down through the cen-
turies, right up to the gibbet of the Cross from which Jesus cries: 
“My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” This cry expresses 
the ultimate powerlessness of Jesus and the failure of every human 
project that arose around him. Nevertheless, the cry—as Chiara 
Lubich emphasizes—is an action of ultimate fidelity because Jesus, 
precisely in asking God the reason for his abandonment, encour-
ages us to continue believing that God’s power is not an empty 
one leading to aimless annihilation, but is an Authority that holds 
in itself a design in which even the abandonment finds mean-
ing.15 Jesus’ cry asks for the purpose, which he does not see, but 
whose existence, safeguarded by the Other, Jesus does not doubt. 
Jesus’ question is an expression of complete fidelity, of a purer faith, 
which leads him beyond his own capacities to accept fully in him-
self the judgment on human power absolutized by Adam, which is 
then restored by Jesus’ cry to the divine Authority.
In fact, the cry of abandonment shows that Jesus’ self-emptying 
goes so far as to endure the complete power of evil unleashed and 
exhausted on him. His cry restores to divine Omnipotence all the 
forces of creation that evil had taken over for itself. With evil con-
tained in Jesus forsaken, God expresses all his Sovereign Power in 
terms of Love, giving himself back to Jesus in the resurrection.16 
According to Guardini, “Jesus treats human power as it is, as a 
reality.”17 I would say more: Jesus renders it real by enduring it, since 
the entire human order becomes a new reality in the Incarnation, 
the final act of which—before the Resurrection—is the cry. Jesus 
confers final reality on evil and delivers it over to God. Human be-
ings now face a choice: espouse the power that has crucified Jesus 
and remain in an order that rejects the original authority, or accept 
the annihilation of that power by being crucified with Jesus, and 
receive, in the Risen Lord, the universal sovereignty over creation 
that Adam had lost.
15. Chiara Lubich, The Cry of Jesus Crucified and Forsaken (New York: New City Press, 
2001), pp. 24–34.
16. Concerning this notion of Sovereignty, see Antonio Maria Baggio, “Trinità e po-
litica: Riflessione su alcune categorie politiche alla luce della rivelazione trinitaria,” 
Nuova Umanità 19 (1997): 727–97. 
17. Guardini, Die Macht, p. 46. 
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This second choice leads to a full restoration of the “mandate of 
dominion,” which is expressed in the recovery of the original lov-
ing relationship among people, energized by the fullness of mean-
ing received from Christ. Jesus himself still reveals the new order 
to us through his cry. His kenosis, in fact, is total abasement; he is 
mingled with the earth. The Hebrew Scripture already called him 
the “worm of the earth,” the completely humble one. By uniting 
with humanity and with the earth, he submits to worldly power, 
which permits him to become “earth”—humus, nourishment—in 
which the Other plants its roots. Crying the Other from the bow-
els of the earth, Jesus expresses the soul of creation. Encompassed 
in him, creation cries out to its own origin: God. The annihila-
tion of Jesus defeats human power as absolute power because in 
the moment in which he submits to it, by crying the Other, he 
expresses his obedience. With this, he reveals his being as Person, 
he reveals the essential relationship of the person that says God, the 
nothing that says Everything.
Personal and Impersonal Power:  
The Question of Responsibility 
The tree and the Cross introduce a “personalistic” conception of 
power. In exploring this aspect, we can begin with Romano Guar-
dini’s definition of power as the ability to put reality into motion.18 
It consists of two elements: force, which is pure capability without 
direction, and conscious awareness, which gives meaning to force. 
Awareness connects power to the aim for which it is exercised 
since power itself is simply a means and does not in itself have 
any definite objective. Awareness, which transforms mere force 
18. Ibid., p. 16.
into power, presupposes some person who exercises it. So, I would 
say that there is no such thing as power correctly understood that 
does not have a personal subject who exercises it and is responsible 
for it. 
However, it is possible for power to be depersonalized when the 
process of applying it is seen as “necessary,” independent of any 
will. This depersonalization process can be put into effect first by 
attributing to power a character of natural objectivity. In this case, 
the role of conscience is eliminated and power becomes a simple 
matter of force not subject to judgment any more than a thun-
derstorm or a change in the seasons. A second way consists of at-
tributing to power a character of scientific objectivity. In this case, 
scientific knowledge is seen as the perfect expression of human 
intelligence to which individual intelligence and the community’s 
politics must be adapted, thus eliminating any thought of evaluat-
ing—ethically and politically—the consequences and the applica-
tions of that knowledge. This elimination of conscience confers 
technological omnipotence: it is good to do all that is in my power 
to do. In both cases, eliminating the role of conscience rules out 
all responsibility. Power is rendered impersonal, hence not respon-
sible. By identifying power with nature or with knowledge, it is not 
accountable for its own action. 
There is a third way of depersonalizing power: by presuppos-
ing—without resorting to the appropriate instruments of verifica-
tion—that the decision of power coincides with the general will of 
those who constitute that power. This is what happens in a dicta-
torship. The dictatorial decision is the expression of an unlimited 
power precisely because it presupposes agreement with the will 
of those who ought to be evaluating that power. The dictator de-
cides arbitrarily with no basis in authority. He or she is not held 
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responsible, because the subject to whom he or she would have to 
render account is eliminated. 
Naturalistic and scientific ideology can also lead to dictator-
ships. For example, a dictatorship can be based on the naturalistic 
idea of the “superman.” Here the claim is that nature has produced 
more advanced individuals, authentic interpreters of the natural 
universe, who are beyond the judgment of conscience understood 
with Friedrich Nietzsche as the weaponry of the weak. In reality, 
true weakness lies with the presumed superman, who wishes to 
avoid the onus of responsibility. But responsibility is inescapable; 
it is not something added on to human action if one wants it or 
thinks it is particularly good. It comes along with the move into 
action. Responsibility comes as a response to a demand, whether 
from “a weak” being, as Paul Ricoeur would say, who needs help 
with a newborn child, another person, or the state; or from an 
inner demand, which, if acted on, would respond to another’s need 
anyway. Assuming responsibility involves not only answering the 
original demand that generated the responsibility itself, but also 
answering the question from the one who asks an accounting for 
what is done, such as the “weak one” who asked for aid. In other 
words, it is not sufficient for someone to assume personal respon-
sibility for oneself. By its very nature, responsibility always involves 
a relationship in which there is a request for help and then for 
an evaluation of what was done. Responsibility fully understood 
brings together both the element of personal conviction that led one 
to dedicate himself or herself to someone or something in the first 
place and the evaluation of the consequences of one’s decision. An-
swering a request for help flows indeed from our own interiority. 
But since it involves a social relationship, it has an interpersonal, or 
public, dimension as well. 
The issue of responsibility is fundamental in order to avoid 
errors in understanding the instrumental nature of power. True, 
power acquires meaning from the aim that conscience assigns to it. 
But such meaning (and morality) does not involve only the aim; it 
must be expressed in the very exercise of power. The form assumed 
by the means is not in fact indifferent to the aim. There are struc-
tures of power that are ethically unacceptable independently of the 
aim that they claim to have, even when it is a good aim. Unaccept-
able in themselves are the exercising of power that do not accept 
rules, limits, and controls insofar as they exclude the element of 
any responsibility or accountability to others. 
The impersonalization of power is expressed in the elimination 
of any accountability, or any sense of responsibility or personal 
relationship. Such impersonalization is a mystification. Power is 
seen as an end in itself, without responsibility, without aim or di-
rection. It is a void that becomes substance. Here is where the 
demoniac is revealed, not as an abstraction but as the presence of a 
“person-nonperson” who is manipulating the power: the demoniac 
is impersonal, anonymous. The absence of nomos, law, constitutes 
arbitrariness. In fact, the law is the order, established by a will, of 
the one responsible, whether an individual or a collective. On the 
contrary, arbitrariness is a constraint imposed anonymously, like 
impersonal necessity. A community governed in this way appears 
deprived of direction or aim, even if the appearances of infinite 
freedom remain. But it is the infinity of the maze where one turns 
this way and that but never escapes, an imitation of real infinity 
much as the devil imitates God. 
The postmodern shape of dictatorship resembles such a maze. 
The dictatorships of the twentieth century are now modern with 
an industrial fingerprint. They have developed a strong and visible 
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power machine, and are not above using violence in imposing ter-
ror. Their functionaries are anonymous gears grinding humanity by 
simply giving orders. The greatest atrocity is perpetrated “banally,” 
Arendt would say, through the churning of the gears. On the other 
hand, postmodern dictatorship is able to impose itself with no ap-
parent show of violence, often with the enthusiastic support of the 
crowds in which every individual thinks he or she is a champion of 
infinite freedom. In the postmodern dictatorship, subjects are not 
forced, but, as Plato would say, persuaded.
In this regard, it is interesting to observe how the demon re-
mains typically impersonal in many facets of the idea of power 
that begins to go along with modernity. Guardini comments: 
Champions of modern progress . . . and the bourgeois, be-
tray a fatal inclination: to exercise power in a more and more 
fundamental, scientifically and technically perfect way, and 
at the same time not to go on the defense openly, trying 
instead to cloak power behind pretexts of usefulness, well-
being, progress and so on. And so man has exercised power 
without developing a corresponding ethic. This gives rise to a 
use of force which is not essentially governed by ethics and is 
more genuinely modeled in the anonymous society.19 
It is characteristic of our modern age that the tendency to abso-
lutize power goes hand in hand with the inability to think about it. 
This may be caused by the fact that, like the ontological character 
of man, power cannot be understood separately from its origin, 
which is in God and in the “image and likeness” that God has 
19. Ibid., pp. 31–32.
impressed in the human person. Recognizing the origin would de-
mand an honest look at the power’s tendency to keep increasing, 
and, at the same time, at its natural limitation that disallows om-
nipotence. When the origin of power is rejected, there is a danger 
that this absolutistic tendency will be accepted—which then be-
comes uncontrollable—and this fact will be concealed with inad-
equate and erroneous explanations. But dictatorships have taken it 
upon themselves to point out the fact of the unrestrainable aspect 
of power. 
Acknowledging a connatural limit to power does not neces-
sarily require faith in the Creator. It can also be based on right 
reason, in the knowledge that every form of power is exercised on 
some prior reality that deserves respect or on some present real-
ity that does not allow free rein to my will. A good definition of 
“reality” in a personalist sense of the reality of the other could be 
“that which is not obtainable by force,” where the other could be 
defined as “one who can say no to me.” The perennial tempta-
tion in our modern world has been to make power autonomous, 
eliminating its relationship to the other, so that it is purely imper-
sonal. This would eliminate, therefore, politics based on the Ar-
istotelian model where the other is an “other me.” Without such 
mutual recognition, there is no real citizenship and there is no real 
politics.
This modern drift is fulfilled in the totalitarian phenomena of 
the 1900s, characterized by a power that does not accept limita-
tions to its own conduct. What is most worrying is that with the 
collapse of visible totalitarianism, some of their fundamental el-
ements are being regenerated in a new postmodern form. Let us 
recall, with the help of Hannah Arendt, the specific elements of 
traditional totalitarianism; then, in the final section of this article, 
56C LAR ITAS | Journal of Dialogue & Culture | Vol. 1, No.1 (March 2012) 
we will try to understand the forms in which it is being regener-
ated in postmodern society and what can be done about it. 
Totalitarianism is characterized, first of all, by a will for infinite 
manipulation. This dynamic has to do with the refusal to recognize 
reality; the denial of the facts related to the “existing situation,” 
which also includes the will of those opposing the totalitarian 
plans; the refusal to recognize the nature of the things; and the 
idea of being able to modify or remake anything. In this pres-
ent postmodern age, the creative omnipotence of totalitarianism 
is no longer seen as a centralized and irresistible power. But it can 
take other forms, as when individuals are also allowed to exercise 
a certain power in some limited areas, where there is no danger 
to political power, as a form of participation in power and as a re-
ward for going along with it. Examples would be genetic manipu-
lation, abortion, and euthanasia, that offer apparent “freedom” to 
people and let the individual share the technological potential of 
society, but make it unlikely that ethical questions will enter into 
discussion. 
This determination to avoid acknowledging reality also neces-
sarily involves the inability to accept the limitations of one’s own 
condition. This is a mistake, not from a desire to halt progress in 
improving people’s lives, but because real progress must take the 
limitations into consideration when it is ethically necessary to do 
so. Denying that reality is a “given” that is not “produced” leads also 
to rejecting the original “gift,” when awareness of it would instead 
promote a sense of gratitude. A grateful person is disposed, in turn, 
to give and to recognize that we have a common patrimony. One 
assumes that the gift will be accepted because all progress is con-
ducted with the hope that it may bring some benefit for all, and 
therefore will take account of the interests of all those involved. 
The only action that is fully human is that which begins by being 
aware of and acknowledging the facts; knowing the boundaries is 
the basis for success and for maintaining a tie to reality. 
Even totalitarianism needs cultic forms to guarantee that there 
is no acknowledgment of a God as an authority distinct from its 
power that could limit its manipulation of reality. It prefers idola-
try, in the form of uncritical adherence to the platitudes nurtured 
by art, by the “forefathers,” by the approved teachers. At the same 
time, absolute enemies must be created and so any contrary ideas 
must be judged deplorable and the traditional religions must be 
discredited, while official ideas are credited as consistent with na-
ture or science. Finally, totalitarianism uses the lie systematically, not 
only to discredit adversaries—if there are any left—but also to re-
write history, denying factual reality. At this point, when limitless 
power is put to the test, we again face the issue of truth and its 
relationship to politics.
Postmodern Society and the “Reconstruction” of Truth 
Our current problem in the daily political debates in the demo-
cratic countries is that we are no longer able to determine who 
is right and who is wrong. This leads certain politicians to take 
opposite sides on the basis of the same principles; it allows some 
to appeal to “sure” facts that others deny. This last point—the de-
nial of factual truth and the impossibility for citizens to ascertain 
it—sounds the political alarm. Denial of the facts has always been 
typical of totalitarian regimes, that eliminate factual truth by sup-
pressing witnesses, burning the books that deal with it, writing 
new versions full of falsehoods, and subjecting teachers to strict 
control. In the end, the lie prevails by direct and brutal elimination 
of the truth.
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In our democratic systems, the process is different, but the re-
sult is the same. Thanks to Hannah Arendt and her analysis of 
“factual truths,” the issue of truth has been reintroduced into the 
political debate. According to Arendt, the denial of factual truth is 
accomplished by the traditional system of rewriting history “under 
the eyes of those who witnessed it. But it is equally true in ‘image-
making’ of all sorts, that every known and established fact can be 
denied or neglected if it is likely to hurt the image. For an image, 
unlike an old-fashioned portrait, is supposed not to flatter reality 
but to offer a full-fledged substitute for it.”20 The lie, as Arendt 
explains, is a form of action in which the liar says “what is not,” in 
order to change “that which is” to his or her own advantage. The 
liar is even more credible when he or she succeeds in first convinc-
ing himself or herself of his or her own lie. 
Self-deception thus becomes one of the fundamental mecha-
nisms of denying factual truth: the liar adjusts to his or her own 
public image and ends up depending on it. It must be continuously 
refurbished through the mass media, that enormously enhances 
the role and the power of those images. The politician, who is 
taken up in this game, conditions the public on the one hand, and 
on the other must also interpret its wishes in continuous interac-
tion with the images produced by the others. At a certain point, 
as we often see in televised debates, it is no longer the players who 
govern the game. The game of images, into which the spectators 
themselves enter by manifesting their approval through opinion 
surveys, now commands the players. Someone will say that public 
opinion should determine the positions of the politicians. But that 
20. Hanna Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 247–48. 
is already a serious matter because an authentic politician should 
have a plan to execute independently of the changing opinions of 
the moment. 
It is even a more serious problem when people no longer see 
any difference between fact and opinion now that factual truths are 
transformed into opinions through the continuous manipulation 
of images. In this way, the mass media becomes the instrument of 
power, leading to a purely procedural conception of democracy. 
The political winner is the one who succeeds in influencing the 
greater number of opinions, whatever the facts may be. The final 
result when totalitarianism eliminates factual truth is telecracy. 
This is the end of politics because, as Arendt explains, factual truth 
“is always related to other people: it concerns events and circum-
stances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses 
and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is 
spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is po-
litical by nature.”21 Eliminating it means eliminating politics. And 
this means that politics, in order to survive, cannot avoid confront-
ing itself with truth, that is, facing the reality of other persons. 
Reality is such precisely because it is “other” in respect to the 
one considering it. At the root of the denial of the truth by the 
various political subjects, singly and collectively, is the denial of 
the other, the determination to distinguish and distance oneself 
from the other, going well beyond any real differences and adding 
to the conflict. This is a formidable error, because it was exactly the 
opposite when the state began with sharing one’s own sad expe-
rience with someone else, appreciating the other’s suffering, and 
offering mutual help in a common difficulty. Think of the Italian 
21. Ibid., pp. 233–34.
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Constituent Assembly, that was able to overcome ideological dif-
ferences and synthesize relevant aspects of their own diverse po-
litical cultures on the basis of the unity reached in opposition to 
Nazi fascism. At the origin of the state is the recognition by all of 
a common experience, a factual truth, along with the principles of 
reason. It is no surprise that the same search for truth in the West, 
through the dialectic experience of the first philosophers, began 
with accepting the other as a valid conversation partner.
At this point, however, the thought of Hannah Arendt no lon-
ger seems to face up to the whole problem we face today, namely, 
the need to address not only diverse opinions unconnected to fac-
tual truths, but also diverse and conflicting philosophical truths 
in the political arena. In fact, she ends up by returning to the old 
philosophical vision of a clear separation between truth and poli-
tics. She argues for it by distinguishing philosophical truth from 
factual truth: “Philosophical truth, when it enters the public arena, 
changes its nature and becomes opinion, because a true and proper 
metábasis eis állo génos takes place, a shift not just from one type 
of reasoning to another, but from one mode of human existence 
to another.”22 Whereas factual truths, as I have cited from Arendt, 
are “connected to other people” and are “political by nature.” But, 
one could object to Arendt: Does not the common recognition 
of factual truth lead to the same problems that arise in the con-
frontation among the various truths of reason? Are not facts like 
truths of reason subject to various interpretations, bearing differ-
ent meanings depending on who observes and draws lessons from 
them that differ from those drawn by others? 
22. Ibid., p. 234.
The difficulty in the relationship between truth and politics, 
then, is not only that we move from truth to opinion, but from the 
political thought of one to that of many. The problem of the pas-
sage from philosophical truth to opinion, before being presented 
in the form so amply and precisely treated by Arendt, would prob-
ably have to be dealt with at its root. It could be expressed in this 
way: Is philosophical truth, which Arendt considers the patrimony 
of individuals, communicable to others? The philosophical truth of 
the individual, according to Arendt, ceases being truth as soon as 
it descends to the public arena, that is, as soon as it is seen as “one” 
of many truths and becomes, therefore, opinion. Here, I would 
respond by contesting Arendt’s major premise: that philosophi-
cal truth regards a person only in his or her singularity. On the 
contrary, philosophical truth is by nature communitarian. There is 
no opposition between the truth of the individual and that of the 
others; rather, it comes about precisely as a unity of the many. 
When Western civilization began and the problem of philo-
sophical truth was raised in a conscious and explicit way so that 
the search for it could begin, it was not understood as only an indi-
vidual effort. On the contrary, one became a philosopher through 
participation in the community. Plato explains that philosophy is 
like a flame that is ignited in the soul of the individual only after a 
long period of life in common and much discussion. The flame is 
lit only after philosophers have lived together in a true and proper 
school of life and thought. The very idea of truth arose as a com-
mon patrimony, and became incomprehensible the moment it was 
considered merely a heritage of an individual. The first philosophi-
cal community, in fact, is a prototype of human community. The 
trend is toward the universal. 
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Arendt speaks about metábasis as passage from the solitary phi-
losopher to the public arena. But the first radical metábasis is that 
of each philosopher when he or she leaves his or her own con-
victions behind in favor of the truth that is only reached collec-
tively. It was Socrates who taught the method: it meant forgetting 
yourself, putting yourself inside the other, taking the other’s point 
of view, and then carrying on in the search for truth in total co-
operation with the other. This is metábasis precisely in the sense of 
acquiring a new location, a change of form. The philosopher leaves 
the territory of his or her own soul—which is illuminated, secure, 
and quite familiar—in order to venture into the space of another. 
It is not by chance that Homer uses the word metáballo to indicate 
Ulysses’ and his companions’ concealment in the belly of the horse, 
the “other” place of darkness and testing that is nevertheless a nec-
essary step for achieving victory. 
If we in the West want to be coherent with the core of our 
being and the civilization that has formed it, we would always have 
to start with this presupposition: that the truth I bring must en-
counter the truth brought by the other, even when that other is 
a political adversary. “My” truth and “his or her truth” have need 
of one another. Either one without the other loses meaning. So, I 
must have at heart not only the success of my party, aware of the 
values that inspired it, but also the success of the other party, with-
out confusing their different identities, but aware that they both 
contribute to a “unity in the truth” that is deeper and stronger than 
any division. 
A political movement that seems necessary in Western demo-
cratic countries is a movement of politicians and citizens that re-
establishes the conditions for unity in politics and sheds new light 
on common foundations and a common goal. Only if the reality 
that unites the political society is clearly a truth common to all 
can the various positions take on meaning. Then it is possible to 
see the original contribution of each one. If that unity should de-
crease, then the identity of each political group becomes indistinct, 
the debate becomes a sectarian scuffle, and politicians can well be 
described by the words that the goddess directed to Parmenides 
some 2,500 years ago at the beginning of the search for truth: 
Mortals, knowing nothing, double-headed, go astray. For 
helplessness in their breasts guides their errant minds. But 
they are carried off equally deaf and blind, hordes without 
judgment, for whom both to be and not to be are judged 
the same and not the same; and the path of everything is 
backward-turning.23 
How can such a reality be reestablished today? First of all, we 
could ask ourselves what has brought us together as a political 
community and then decide to be, first of all, citizens who focus 
on the principles and common values on which our political cama-
raderie is based. Our first allegiance, and the determining one that 
confers unity on the political body, is the fact that there is a unity 
that comes before all our differences. Differences are important 
too, if straightforwardly understood. To do that, we must return to 
the original ideals that formed us as a political group, to the roots 
of our political culture, assessing the deep human need that led to 
the birth of our party. We need to rediscover the authentic values 
that it wanted to incarnate in history. We must preserve them as 
a gift for the entire community, not for one party in conflict with 
23. Poem of Parmenides, Fragment 6.5–6.9. 
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others. Distinctiveness, we could say, is our second allegiance. It does 
not give lie to the first, but achieves it because through it each of 
us distinguishes our own task within the collectivity. It is by living 
out our distinctiveness as a gift for the other that we build unity. 
It is time we had the courage to undertake this radical revision, 
which involves not only individuals, but also political groupings 
and the entire community. We would do well to start even if we do 
not know where the process will take us. It is not necessary to know 
everything. Indeed, I would say that it is best not to know it and to 
be aware that we do not possess the solution. This ignorance does 
not limit our action. Not even Jesus in his abandonment knew, but 
that did not prevent him from going ahead to the end. It allowed 
him to express completely his fidelity to the truth. Not having the 
solution leads us to search for it with others; it helps us avoid fall-
ing into an ideology that thinks we can impose our rationale on 
everyone. The last thought of the authentic person will always be 
for the other; his or her last word will be always: “Why?” 
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